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Abstract 
 
The present essay is the second in a series of three papers which examine alternative 
approaches to inflation. Here we identify some of the principal criticisms expressed 
against neoclassical views on price behaviour and business behaviour. These 
challenges grew from the early discovery of ‘administered prices’ by Means and the 
subsequent findings by Hall and Hitch regarding ‘full-cost’ pricing. The notions that 
industrial prices were relatively inflexible and that businessmen set those prices by 
imprecise rules-of-thumb stood in sharp contrast to the pristine simplicity of 
neoclassical models. Yet these attempts for greater realism seemed to undermine the 
prospects of constructing a coherent theory for prices. 
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Introduction
 
The economic and political turbulence of the 1930s spawned a number of serious 
challenges to the hegemony of classical economic doctrines. Of these challenges, 
only Keynes’ ‘new economics’ was broadly accepted and assimilated into the 
mainstream of economic thinking. Keynes was successful partly because his policy 
propositions sought to reform capitalism while preserving its underlying structure. 
According to Keynes, the malfunctioning of the system stemmed primarily from a 
chronic lack of synchronization between the ‘propensities’ of consumers and the 
‘animal spirits’ of investors. The ultimate problem was rooted not in the structure of 
capitalism but in fundamental psychological tendencies stemming from human nature 
itself.1 In this context, his call for government intervention appeared to be fairly 
conservative: policies were needed not to alter basic power relationships among 
specific economic groups but merely to overcome an unfortunate gap between 
abstract saving and investment ‘tendencies.’ 
As an orthodox student of Marshall, Keynes rarely questioned the basic 
structural tenets of neoclassical microeconomics and, indeed, he saw no apparent 
reason to do so. In his opinion, the macroeconomic problem of unemployment arose 
despite the efficiency of individual markets and, furthermore, the solution for the 
problem could be achieved by broad policy measures which need not interfere with 
the functioning of these individual markets.2 The apparent success of early Keynesian 
policies during and after the Second World War further strengthened the conviction 
that macroeconomics was quite independent of underlying microeconomic 
structures. This legacy of Keynesian macroeconomics has proven more powerful 
then Keynesian theory itself, for while the primacy of Keynesianism has been 
subsequently challenged by competing schools, macroeconomics as a whole 
continues to neglect significant aspects of real structures and institutions. 
The eventual divorce of mainstream macroeconomics from the dynamics of real 
economic structure was established only in the post-war era, however. During the 
1930s, before the apparent triumph of Keynesian policies, economists were seeking 
answers also in alternative directions. While Keynes was elaborating the 
psychological reasoning for his General Theory, some of his contemporaries were 
trying to identify structural causes for the general economic distress. Their subject of 
                                                 
     1 See for example Keynes (1936), p. 97 and p. 161. Keynes was of course very much aware 
of contemporary structures and institutions but these were significant for his General Theory 
only in so far as they enhanced the tendency for stagnation or instability. The primary cause for 
these tendencies remained human nature. 
     2 Being aware of contemporary research, Keynes (1936, pp. 268, 270-1) was careful to stress 
that his theory abstracted from ‘administered’ or ‘monopoly’ prices. Half a century later, 
Tobin (1983, p. 299) expressed retroactive regret for this turn of events: ‘It is unfortunate that 
Keynes, in spite of the Chamberlin-Robinson revolution that was occurring in 
microeconomics at the same time he was making his macro revolution, chose to challenge 
orthodoxy on its own microeconomic grounds of competitive markets.’ 
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inquiry concerned basic convictions about ‘price behaviour’ and ‘business 
behaviour.’ First, the pioneering work by Means (1935a) and by the National 
Resources Committee (1939) under his direction questioned the monolithic approach 
to price dynamics. Means suggested that there were in fact two types of prices – those 
which were relatively flexible and those which were relatively inflexible. More 
importantly, he argued that this basic difference was rooted in the structure of 
modern capitalism. Second, the research by Hall and Hitch (1939) challenged 
accepted assumptions regarding pricing decisions by firms. Their interviews with 
businessmen indicated that the latter determined their prices by imprecise 
rules-of-thumb and were quite indifferent to the notion of ‘profit maximization.’ 
These studies launched a prolonged controversy which has not yet been ‘resolved’ 
and, because it involves basic methodological issues, perhaps could not be resolved. 
The purpose of this essay is not to provide a review of this literature but rather to 
examine key methodological questions arising from it. Given our limited goal and 
the availability of numerous surveys, we find it appropriate to focus only on some of 
the important contributions to the debate. 
Briefly, the link between ‘price behaviour’ and ‘business behaviour’ involves 
questions of ‘structure’ and economic or business ‘power.’ The neoclassical notion of 
‘pricing power’ suggested that a firm could set its own price but, since the firm was 
assumed to maximize profit, economists could still ‘determine’ what that price would 
be. The increasing emphasis since the 1930s on the significance of oligopolistic 
interdependency did not prove to be detrimental for price theory. With sufficiently 
restrictive assumptions and a complicated mathematical reasoning, economists often 
succeeded in finding an ‘optimal solution’ for their game theory. The literature 
following Means and Hall and Hitch undermined this logical simplicity. The 
existence of relative price inflexibility in markets other than pure competition did not 
imply that such prices were ‘optimal’ for firms. It only suggested that prices were 
‘administered’ and this was precisely the problem. If these were ‘monopoly prices’ in 
the neoclassical sense they should have been perhaps higher than comparable 
competitive prices, but there was no reason to expect them to be less flexible. The 
fact that administered prices were relatively inflexible implied that firms might not 
have been acting ‘optimally.’ The writings on business behaviour strengthened this 
doubt when they pointed to substantial ambiguities and considerable discretion in the 
way firms set their pricing policies. 
Ironically, by emphasizing the significance of structure for actual pricing, the new 
empirical literature operated to undermine the methodological basis for price theory 
itself. It was implied that firms operating in non-perfectly competitive markets had 
the privilege not only to determine their own prices, but also to set these prices in a 
rather ‘arbitrary’ manner. Prices were still influenced by ‘objective’ conditions such 
as cost, demand, the specific structure of the industry, or the intensity of competition. 
However, since firms enjoyed substantial discretion over their own goals, the 
‘mapping’ of these objective conditions into prices was obscured from the economist. 
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Obviously, these issues have considerable bearing on ‘structural’ theories of inflation 
which we explore in an accompanying paper (Nitzan, 1990). 
The first and second sections of this paper deal with the early contributions to 
the administered-price controversy and the criticisms they elicited. The third section 
explores the early literature on ‘full-cost’ pricing while, in the fourth section, we deal 
with the marginalists’ counterattacks against that literature. The fifth section 
examines the aspects concerning the ‘target’ rate of return and the last section offers 
some observations on the anthropology of business behaviour. 
 
1. The Administered Price Controversy: Beginnings 
 
The controversy over the relationship between market structure and price behaviour 
was triggered in 1935 by the work of Means on Industrial Prices and Their Relative 
Inflexibility.3 Means raised two basic questions concerning (1) the apparent anomaly 
in the behaviour of numerous industrial prices, and (2) the causes behind this 
behaviour. First, he argued that comprehensive price indices, such as the Wholesale 
Price Index published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), were potentially 
misleading because they failed to distinguish between ‘market prices’ and 
‘administered prices.’ Market prices were defined as prices which were ‘made in the 
market as a result of the interaction of buyers and sellers.’ Administered prices, in 
contrast, were ‘set by administrative action and held constant for a period of time’ 
while sales fluctuated with demand at the rigid price (Means, 1935b, p. 401). This 
distinction was highly significant because market and administered prices ‘behaved’ 
quite differently in terms of both frequency and amplitude of change. 
The evidence for such divergent behaviour was based on an analysis of monthly 
prices for individual commodities included in the BLS Wholesale Price Index. 
Means classified 747 such items according to the number of times their price changed 
during the eight-year period between 1926 and 1933 and demonstrated that prices for 
the majority of items changed either very frequently or very infrequently.4 His 
inference that these were in fact ‘quite different types of prices’ was further enhanced 
by illustrating that ‘items which changed frequently in price showed a large drop 
                                                 
     3 Although he initiated the debate, Means was not the first to draw attention to price 
inflexibility and to discuss its potential causes. Stigler and Kindahl (1970, pp. 11-12) cited 
earlier works by Berlund and by Jones on the rigidity of steel prices during the early 20th 
century. In 1927, Mills published a comprehensive study on The Behavior of Prices where he 
found, much like Means’ later discovery, that industrial prices appeared to be either flexible or 
inflexible in their frequency of change. Another study by Tinter (1935) on price behaviour in 
Germany, England and the United States, suggested that the frequency of price changes in 
monopolized industries was appreciably smaller than in competitive ones. 
     4 Of the 747 item prices, 50 percent changed very infrequently (between 0 and 24 price 
changes during a period of 96 months), 24 percent changed very frequently (between 80 and 
94 times), while 26 percent fell in the intermediate range (between 25 and 79 times over the 
period). See Means (1935b) Chart I, p. 402. 
 
 
 
 
 
4  
during the depression while those having a low frequency of change tended to drop 
little in price’ (Means, 1935b, p. 402 and p. 403). Additional evidence published 4 
years later by the National Resources Committee under the direction of Means 
indicated that, as prices recovered between 1933 and 1937, frequency and amplitude 
of price changes were again positively related. 
Writing during the depression of the 1930s, Means was primarily attentive to the 
broad economic implications of this distinction between market and administered 
prices. Based on the observation that a substantial number of commodities (over one 
half) had administered prices, he argued that relative price inflexibility became a 
major disruptive factor in the American economy: 
 
We have always relied in the past on the automatic balancing of economic 
activity through price changes. This is all right where prices are flexible, 
since a general drop in demand such as occurred in the depression would 
result in a drop of prices and maintained production. If all prices had been 
flexible it is doubtful if we would have had a serious depression after the 
stock crash of 1929. Where prices are rigid, however, a general drop in 
demand has quite different and most disastrous result. Instead of producing 
lower prices, the drop in demand produces a drop in sales and in 
production. Workers have less to spend, thus amplifying the original drop in 
demand. In this manner, rigid prices can expand an initial small fluctuation 
of industrial activity into a cataclysmic depression. (1935b, p. 405) 
 
Means went on to illustrate that between 1929 and the spring of 1933 there was a 
marked inverse relationship between the relative drop in prices and the relative 
decline in production for a sample of ten major industries. When prices fell 
substantially, like in the case of agricultural commodities or petroleum for example, 
the decline in output was below 20 percent, while when prices remained stubbornly 
rigid like in agricultural implements or motor vehicles, production levels dropped by 
as much as 80 percent! 
Given the prevalence of administered prices and given the disruptive effect their 
relative inflexibility had on macroeconomic performance, Means set to address the 
second issue, namely the cause behind the phenomenon. In his opinion, 
administered prices emerged primarily (though not exclusively) as a consequence of 
industrial concentration. Although he expressed this conviction forcefully already in 
1935, empirical support for his ‘concentration thesis’ was first provided only in the 
National Resources Committee monograph published in 1939. There Means 
examined price changes between 1929 and 1932 for a subset of 37 out of the 282 
manufacturing industries included in the Census’ universe, and contrasted them with 
four-enterprise concentration ratios associated with each individual industry. In 
selecting the sample, Means sought to eliminate the possible influence factors other 
than concentration might have had on price changes. Consequently, he excluded 
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industries where (1) products were not relatively homogenous, (2) more than 2/3rds 
of the product value originated outside of manufacturing, possibly in 
demand-sensitive industries such as agriculture or some raw materials, (3) products 
were not produced for national or international markets, so national concentration 
ratios were misleading, and (4) reasonably reliable price data were not available. 
Based on a scatter diagram between percent change in price and concentration ratios 
for the 37 industries, Means concluded that ‘When the depression drop of prices in 
these industries is compared with the proportion of value of product which in each 
was produced by the four largest enterprises, a rough relation is apparent between 
concentration and price insensitivity’ (National Resources Committee, 1939, p. 142). 
Means repeatedly emphasized that the existence of administered prices was not 
synonymous with ‘monopoly profits’ and that the process of industrial concentration 
did not necessarily mean a growing ‘monopolization’:  
 
It is . . . abundantly clear that a considerable degree of administrative control 
is inherent in the narrowing of markets and the willingness of buyers to 
accept the one-price system of American merchandising. Further 
administrative controls is implicit if the efficiencies of modern technology 
are to be realized. Only to the extent that administrative controls arise from 
collusion between enterprises or through the bringing of production under 
common control beyond the extent necessary for efficient operation is there 
an opportunity to reduce the existing degree of administrative control 
without incurring a cost of decreased efficiency in the use of resources. 
(National Resources Committee, 1939, p. 145) 
 
In this context, economic ‘power’ was perceived not so much as an attribute of 
broader social relationships but more as a facet of industrial organization. The power to 
determine prices did not denote the ability of one group to redistribute income from 
another, but rather the ability of ‘organizations’ to overcome the ‘market.’ Thus, the 
apparent link between industrial concentration and the administration of prices was 
rooted primarily in the growing ‘bureaucratization’ of economic activity: 
 
. . . the last century has seen a steadily increasing shift from market 
coordination to administrative coordination. Gradually, as our great 
corporations have been built up, more and more of the coordination of 
individual economic action has been brought about administratively. . . . As 
a result of this shift from market to administration, the area of coordination 
remaining to the market has been greatly reduced while the increased 
bargaining power of the big administrative units has induced the counter 
concentration in the form of cooperative bargaining organization, farm 
cooperatives, labor unions and to a small extent consumer cooperatives, 
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thus further reducing the number of separate units interacting through the 
market. (Means, 1935b, p. 407) 
 
To a significant extent, then, the adverse consequences of administered prices were 
the inescapable price we must all pay for technological progress: 
 
Thus a considerable degree of administrative control over prices appears to 
be inherent in the modern economy. Administrative prices and their depression 
insensitivity seem to be an integral part of the structure of economic activity. 
With the century-long transition of this country from a predominantly 
agriculture to a predominantly industrial country, the 
administration-dominated prices of industry have gradually displaced the 
market-dominated prices of agriculture as the more characteristic form of 
prices. (National Resources Committee, 1939, p. 145, emphases added) 
  
Although Means pointed to a structural cause underlying the overall economic 
depression, he recommended not to alter but accommodate that structure. Breaking 
up large scale enterprises in order to revive price flexibility, he argued, would be 
immensely wasteful in terms of foregone output and hence he suggested we ‘accept 
inflexible prices as inherent in our modern economy and build our economic 
institutions around them in such a manner that inflexible administered prices will 
cease to be a disruptive factor’ (Means, 1935b, p. 408). To that end, he proposed we 
adopt expansionary monetary policies, but although his recommendations were 
macroeconomic in nature, his analytical framework was too controversial to be 
unanimously accepted as a basis for such policies.  
The idea that firms administered their prices with a considerable disregard to 
‘market signals’ challenged basic theoretical convictions about ‘optimal’ behaviour. 
Furthermore, Means’ presupposition that such administrative control was largely 
unrelated to conventional notions of economic ‘power’ and ‘monopoly profits’ was 
not sufficiently persuasive to defuse public concern. A series of Congressional 
hearings on administered prices in general and on steel prices in particular began in 
the late 1940s and extended through the 1950s. Guidelines on wage and price 
policies were issued by the Council of Economic Advisors in 1962 and were aimed 
particularly at concentrated industries such as steel, copper and aluminum. The 
announcement of these Guidelines was followed by heightened confrontation 
between the subjected industries and the Presidential office and the debate over 
administered prices received considerable public attention. Means’ interpretation that 
price inflexibility was predominately a ‘technical’ outgrowth of modern ‘industrial 
organization’ and his suggestion that public policy could ‘overcome’ the problem of 
administered prices presupposed that, in itself, the administration of prices served no 
particular interests. Given the public turmoil over the issue, this was not a very 
convincing assumption. There was a growing atmosphere of crisis among economists 
 
 
 
 
 
7  
and many mainstream scholars who felt as if the ‘sky were falling’ became receptive 
toward evidence or explanations which would discredit the administered price thesis. 
Not surprisingly, then, the publication of Industrial Prices and Their Price Inflexibility 
generated an enduring controversy surrounding both the existence of administered 
prices and their relation to economic structure. 
 
2. Price Inflexibility: Fact or Fancy? 
 
A most promising line of assault on Means’ thesis was to deny the very inflexibility 
of administered prices, for if ‘administered prices’ were flexible they were no longer a 
cause for concern for either economists or politicians. This could have been done by 
either demonstrating that ‘administered prices’ changed frequently (in other words, 
that they were not really ‘administered’) or by showing that even if they changed 
only infrequently, the amplitude of such changes was sufficiently large. Let us briefly 
examine these criticisms beginning with the ‘frequency’ issue. 
In a staff paper for the Price Statistic Review Committee, headed by Stigler in 
1961, McAllister demonstrated that the frequency of change in BLS price indices was 
positively related to the number of reporting companies. This meant that a price 
index which combined information from all reporting companies changed more 
frequently than the price for each of the individual companies.5 Following this study, 
Stigler (1962, p. 5) concluded that 
 
Means’ tabulations of frequency of price change are unknown mixture of the 
actual behavior of quoted prices and the number of firms reporting such 
prices. By increasing the number of price reporters, the B.L.S. can reduce 
price inflexibility by the same order of magnitude as the increase in the 
number of reports. The major development which Means believes to have 
outmoded neoclassical economic theory is the “development” of collecting a 
number of price quotations inappropriate to the measurement of short-run 
flexibility. 
 
Although Blair (1964) promptly indicated that this criticism was based on a simple 
misunderstanding of Means’ procedure, Stigler and Kindahl (1970, p. 20) still 
insisted that ‘The McAllister analysis effectively destroys the entire body of work 
resting upon frequency of price change.’ The offensive crumbled a year later, when 
Stigler (1971) finally realized that Means had access to the raw data of the BLS and 
that he in fact analyzed the number of price changes reported by the individual 
companies. 
                                                 
     5 ‘Government Price Statistics,’ Hearings before the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of 
the Joint Economic Committee, 87th Congress, 1st Sess., 1961. Cited in Stigler and Kindahl 
(1970), p. 19. See also McAllister (1961). 
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While the infrequency of administered-price changes was indeed quite 
remarkable when compared to market prices, this, in itself, was a relatively minor 
matter for concern. The crux of Means’ discovery was that when prices were 
‘administered’ (changing only infrequently), their amplitude of change was unduly 
small and it was this aspect of his findings which drew the heaviest fire. The 
criticism, first expressed by Thorp (1936), was that BLS price series were based on 
quoted prices and hence failed to reflect the array of secret or undisclosed rebates, 
discounts and concessions included in actual transaction prices. As Thorp later 
argued, this discrepancy by itself could explain the mysterious inflexibility of the BLS 
series:  
 
Frequently a commodity will be quoted at an unchanged price over a period 
of years and thus to the extent that indexes include this type of quotations 
they will remain relatively unchanged. Actually, the manufacturers of the 
product may have shaved or cut the price of the item drastically, in periods 
when business was slow and boosted it as economic conditions improved 
without the change being recorded in the quoted price. (Thorp and Crowder, 
1941b, p. 406) 
 
As a matter of fact, Means was aware of this potential inaccuracy of the BLS series 
and, as already indicated, he excluded industries for which price data seemed 
inappropriate. Furthermore, he expressed his confidence that, despite their 
shortcomings, BLS data reflected actual prices: 
 
I have become convinced the bulk of their quotations represent net prices. 
The exceptions seemed unlikely to falsify seriously the picture which I 
presented. Consultation with the technical staff of the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics supports this view. So far as this question is concerned, I am 
confident that the statistical picture is not seriously faulty. (Means, 1936, p. 
28) 
 
The adequacy of BLS data was subsequently evaluated in an appendix to the 
National Resources Committee report, where Nelson compared these data to 
‘realization’ prices of the Census of Manufacturing. ‘Realization’ prices were taken 
as an approximation for actual ‘unit prices’ because they were derived as a ratio 
between the total dollar value of the industry’s sales and a corresponding index for 
total physical quantity. The analysis of price movements between 1929 and 1933 for 
28 commodities indicated the existence of positive relationships between the two 
indices for most but not all products in the sample. Nelson (1939, p. 185) concluded 
that there was room for caution in using the BLS wholesale price data, yet 
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after all due allowance is made for the factors demanding caution, very 
marked and significant differences still remain between the behavior of rigid 
and flexible prices. For the statement and interpretation of such different 
types of price behavior, Bureau of Labor Statistics series can be regarded as 
furnishing an acceptable basis. 
 
Unfortunately, such comparisons with Census data proved rather ineffective in 
resolving the dispute. Critics of Means still argued that disparities between the 
indices were sufficiently large to disqualify the BLS series, while supporters 
maintained that the discrepancies arose mainly because the Census data constituted a 
current-based index and, hence, were not strictly comparable to the fixed-based 
indices published by the BLS.6 
The most serious attack on the empirical basis underlying Means’ thesis was 
launched by Stigler and Kindahl (1970) in their NBER study on The Behavior of 
Industrial Prices between 1957 and 1966. The authors argued that in the reality of a 
modern industrial system, many products had a complex ‘price structure’ which 
could not be approximated by a single number. The price structure for a commodity 
was affected by the various physical characteristics the product could be sold at (such 
as size, finish, or packaging) and by the many possible ‘terms of sale’ associated with 
different transactions (for example, when price is related to the quantity purchased or 
credit terms). The BLS series were based on selected ‘typical’ products with 
pre-specified characteristics and given terms of sale, but changes in the list price of 
such products need not reflect the heterogeneous experience of a multitude of buyers 
who bought other varieties under different terms of sale. As an alternative to the BLS 
method, Stigler and Kindahl constructed price indices for some 68 commodities 
which they obtained from 279 different public-sector and private-sector buyers. The 
commodities represented approximately 19 percent of the value of all products 
included in the BLS Wholesale Price Index and were limited mainly to ‘widely used 
staple individual materials’ in order to bypass the measurement difficulty presented 
by quality changes. The buyers were mostly large companies and institutions which, 
according to the authors, were most likely to enjoy secret rebates. 
Stigler and Kindahl declared that, after analyzing their new data, they have 
found ‘a predominant tendency of prices to move in response to the movement of 
general business’ and no evidence ‘to suggest that price rigidity or “administration” is 
                                                 
     6 Ross (1964) suggested for example, that during a contraction, the Census index would 
appear more flexible mainly because it allowed shifts to lower-priced items within Census 
categories. The Census price index would be inaccurate also because it reflected changes in 
both price and product mix for multi-product industries and was further contaminated by 
inter-company non arm’s length transactions. (These observations made by Ross are cited in 
Blair [1972], p. 434.) Other researchers such as Thorp and Crowder (1941a, pp. 391-92) felt 
that these theoretical incompatibilities were not very serious and the two indices should move 
fairly closely together. 
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a significant phenomenon’ (p. 9). In their opinion, the lack of a generally accepted 
theoretical explanation for inflexible ‘administered prices’ was no coincidence, for 
the very existence of such inflexible prices was largely a statistical artifact. Yet the 
apparently definitive language of these conclusions stood in sharp contrast to the 
body of evidence on which they presumably rested. If anything, the new NBER data 
and the analysis by Stigler and Kindahl seemed to both reinforce the validity of the 
BLS series and reconfirm the administered price thesis! 
Stigler and Kindahl compared the behaviour of BLS and NBER series for 
individual commodity groups and, instead of great disparities, they found that in all 
but one of the cases (rubber and rubber products), the two indices had similar trends 
and close cyclical movements. They also found close similarity in the behaviour of 
the comprehensive index which included all the individual commodities. These 
observations were contrary to what one would expect if the new NBER data were to 
put the administrative-price thesis to rest: ‘In view of the parallelism between the two 
series,’ Blair (1972, p. 463) commented, ‘it is difficult to see how the 
administered-price doctrine could find support in the BLS indexes but be disproved 
by the new transaction prices.’ The apparent contradiction was resolved by Means 
(1972) who, feeling personally under attack, sought to strike Stigler and Kindahl with 
their own data.7 According to Means, their study was seriously flawed for two basic 
reasons. First and foremost, the two researchers simply misunderstood his 
administered price thesis. Second, Stigler and Kindahl’s conclusions had no basis in 
their own data which, in fact, supported both their own incorrect interpretation of 
the administered-price thesis as well as the correct version of Means. 
The conclusion of Stigler and Kindahl that there were no evidence for significant 
price rigidity was supported by two summary tables (pp. 8-9), where the 68 price 
indices were classified according to their average behaviour over the contractions of 
1957-58 and 1960-61 and over the expansions of 1958-60 and 1961-1966. The tables 
indicated that in 56 percent of the cases prices move pro-cyclically, in 17 percent of 
the cases they remained the same and in 27 percent of the cases prices moved 
counter-cyclically. Means observed that pro-cyclical movements in just over half of 
the cases could not be considered a very robust proof for classical price flexibility, but 
accentuated the deficiency was much more serious. A key problem was that Stigler 
and Kindahl (p. 3) attributed to Means the notion that administered prices were 
‘wholly unresponsive’ to cyclical market movement, while Means’ original thesis (and 
the very title of his first 1935 study) emphasized their ‘relative inflexibility.’ The 
difference between the two interpretations was clarified in reference to a broader 
taxonomy:  
 
                                                 
     7 The personal tone was rather evident in Means’ reply to Stigler and Kindahl: ‘Nor can 
there be any question that the authors are aiming to test the Means’ thesis. Means is indicated 
as the source of the “doctrine” being tested. The name “Means” appears seventeen times in 
the first eighteen pages. And no other source is given for the doctrine’ (Means, 1972, p. 294). 
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Basically, the administered-price thesis holds that a large body of industrial 
prices do not behave in the fashion that classical theory would lead one to 
expect. . . . This departure from classical behavior in a business cycle could 
theoretically take any one of three forms. In a recession an administered 
price might fall substantially less than classically competitive market prices; 
it might show no substantial change; or it might rise contracyclically. These 
can be referred to, respectively, as relatively inflexible, rigid, and contracyclical 
behavior. Any one of these three reactions to a general fall in demand would 
be classically unexpected except as some noncyclical factor intervened such 
as a trend of technical change. Similarly, in a recovery, an administered 
price might rise less, show no change, or actually fall. (Means, 1972, pp. 
292-3, emphases added) 
 
Using this classification, Means distinguished between the ‘full’ administered-price 
thesis which included all 3 deviations from classical behaviour and the ‘truncated’ 
version of Stigler and Kindahl, which treated all pro-cyclical price movements – 
including those which were relatively inflexible – as being in conflict with the thesis 
and considered only rigid and counter-cyclical behaviour as supporting it. Evidently, 
the ‘truncated’ version adopted by Stigler and Kindahl was only a subset of the ‘full’ 
version as expressed by Means. 
Moreover, in their zeal to discredit Means’ thesis, Stigler and Kindahl 
committed several methodological errors and hence failed to properly interpret their 
own data. By correcting these errors, Means showed that the new data in fact 
supported the ‘truncated’ version of the administered-price thesis, and the ‘full’ 
version as well! First, Stigler and Kindahl identified the period between January 1960 
and November of 1966 as a period of cyclical recovery while the data indicated that 
the cyclical recovery in fact ended in March of 1962 and was followed by 56 months 
of a non-cyclical expansion. Second, of the 63 commodities for which NBER data 
were actually provided, 13 were either produced in competitive markets or had a 
substantial portion of their input costs determined in competitive markets for 
raw-materials. Third, by classifying individual indices according to their average 
change over the two recoveries or two recessions rather than according to their 
behaviour in each of the 4 periods, Stigler and Kindahl attributed uniform 
‘tendencies’ to many commodities which in fact exhibited none. (For example, a 
commodity for which the price moved pro-cyclically in one expansion and 
counter-cyclically or not at all in the second expansion should not be said to have a 
‘tendency’ based on its average price change over the two expansions.) In 
reexamining the NBER data, Means concentrated on the 50 commodities which 
were relevant for the administered price thesis, restricted himself to periods of 
unambiguous cyclical movements and considered each of the 4 cyclical phases in 
isolation. The indices for these 50 commodities had 200 opportunities to change over 
the 2 contractions and 2 recoveries and in 69 percent of these cases their changes 
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conformed with the ‘truncated’ version (Means, 1972, Table 1, p. 296). Means also 
used another classification in which he separately defined indices that either moved 
counter-cyclically or did not move at all in 3 or 4 of the cyclical movements as 
‘tending to support the truncated version,’ from those indices which move 
pro-cyclically in 3 or 4 of the cyclical movements as ‘tending not to support the 
truncated version.’ A test based on this classification indicated that 60 percent of the 
indices tended to support the ‘truncated’ version, 36 percent were neutral and only 4 
percent tended to reject it. These data also supported the ‘full’ version when Means 
accounted for relative price inflexibility (Table 2, p. 296). The ‘neutral’ indices (36 
percent of the total) which showed no tendency to either support or reject the 
‘truncated’ version according to this test, dropped by an average of only 2 percent in 
the two contractions compared with close to 7 percent for the 13 market-dominated 
indices excluded from the sample. In the two recoveries, market-dominated indices 
increased by 3.5 percent, while the average for the neutral indices declined by 0.8 
percent! Means (p. 297) also reviewed the analysis by Stigler and Kindahl for specific 
cycles. The authors had examined price movements for specific commodities in 66 
instances where the demand for these individual commodities experienced a sharp 
cyclical change. According to the data, price behaviour in 85 percent of the cases 
supported the ‘truncated’ administered price thesis, yet Stigler and Kindahl described 
this test as a ‘relatively unsuccessful investigation,’ characterized its results as 
‘unprepossessing’ and failed to even mention them as part of their main findings!8 
The debate over the adequacy of BLS data was complicated by further questions. 
Blair (1956, p. 429) argued that secret rebates need not be limited to administered 
prices and could be found in market prices as well. In other words, BLS data could 
be underestimating the true extent of price flexibility for both types of prices and in 
order to test whether or not administered prices were relatively inflexible we needed to 
compare transaction data for the two indices. To refute Means’ thesis, one had to 
show not only that actual administered prices were ‘flexible’ but also that they were 
as flexible as actual market prices. Of even greater consequences for the debate was the 
emergence since the 1950s of significant counter-cyclical price movements during 
downswings. The development was particularly disconcerting for those who 
considered administered prices to be a statistical mirage, for the occurrence of this 
new phenomenon effectively invalidated their argument. As Adams and Lanzillotti 
noted, one could reasonably speculate that, facing a recession, companies would 
reduce their quoted prices by less than they reduce their actual prices, but it was not 
very convincing to argue that as demand fell, firms raised their list prices only to 
compensate for such increases by even larger secret rebates and discounts.9 
                                                 
     8 For more on the debate, see Blair (1972, pp. 461-6), Moore (1972), Ross and Wachter 
(1973) and Stigler and Kindahl (1973). 
     9 On this Adams and Lanzillotti wrote: ‘[If] Stigler is correct about the illusion of quoted 
prices, why in the spring of 1962 did United States Steel not simply raise its transaction prices 
to the level of its quoted prices? Why did Roger Blough, who is certainly conversant with the 
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In general, attempts to deny the existence of administered prices or their 
‘perverse’ behaviour were more reassuring than convincing.10 The criticisms, 
particularly when voiced by eminent economists, helped to reduce the anxiety and 
justify the continued theoretical neglect of the issue, but never succeeded in 
eradicating it.11 Continued concern with administered prices was also fuelled by a 
related debate which began at about the same time and which focused on how 
individual firms actually set their prices. 
 
3. ‘Full-Cost’ Pricing 
 
While Means (1935a) initiated a controversy over ‘price behaviour,’ the Oxford 
Economists’ Research Group, and in particular Hall and Hitch (1939), helped to 
launch a related debate over ‘business behaviour.’ The conventional theory of the 
firm, argued Hall and Hitch, stipulated that firms attempted to maximize their profits 
and that they did so by choosing the output-price combination (or output in the case 
of perfect competition) such that marginal revenue was equal to marginal cost. This 
approach yielded theoretical solutions for equilibrium in the case of pure 
competition, pure monopoly or monopolistic competition, but when the structure 
was oligopolistic or when monopolistic competition was mixed with oligopoly, the 
theoretical method broke down. In those latter instances, interdependency between 
firms meant that individual demand and marginal revenue curves were 
indeterminate and, hence, could not be used to determine the output-price 
combination for maximum profits. Economists commonly chose to either ignore the 
difficulty by considering oligopoly as an ‘exception’ or to bypass it by using some 
ad-hoc explanations. According to Hall and Hitch, these two solutions were directed 
                                                                                                                         
facts of life in the steel industry, insist on raising a fictitious price? Did he not know that a 
simple revision of transaction prices would have served his purpose and also saved him from 
detection by the B.L.S. (and its henchmen)? In short, given Stigler’s model, Mr. Blough was 
either a fool or a provocateur, hankering for a joust with the President of the United States. 
Both these interpretations of Mr. Blough’s behavior tax credulity’ (88the Cong., 1st Sess., 
Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 
Administered Prices: A Compendium on Public Policy, 1963, pp. 6-7). Quoted in Blair (1972, p. 
436). 
     10 For example, Weiss (1977) concluded that over long period of times, the Wholesale Price 
Index of the BLS, the ‘realization’ price index based on the Census of Manufacturing and the 
buyers’ index developed by the NBER were highly correlated and conveyed the same general 
movements. Coutts, Godley and Nordhaus (1978) compared list and transaction prices for 
non-food manufacturing industries in the U.K. and concluded that ‘There was little evidence 
found to support the view that the wholesale price indices, being composed of listed 
quotations, do not accurately measure transaction prices’ (p. 138). 
     11 Commenting on the title of Blair’s article, ‘Administered Prices: A Phenomenon in Search 
of a Theory,’ Bailey (1959, p. 460) brushed aside the entire debate as irrelevant and suggested 
it was in fact ‘A Theory in Search of a Phenomenon.’ Since then the phrase has been often 
cited as a summary statement on the insignificance of administered prices. 
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toward the wrong problem. In their opinion, the interesting question was not so 
much how firms should set their price and output in order to maximize profit, but 
whether firms indeed set prices and output in order to maximize profit. Their concern 
was not with what firms ought to be doing but rather with what they were actually 
doing. 
In an attempt to address this latter question, Hall and Hitch conducted 
interviews with 38 British entrepreneurs of which 33 were involved in 
manufacturing, 3 were retailers and 2 were builders. Based on these interviews, they 
pointed to a wide gap between the presumptions of conventional analysis and the 
reality of business practices: 
 
For the above [neoclassical] analysis it is necessary that entrepreneurs 
should in fact (a) make some estimate (even if implicitly) of the elasticity 
and position of their demand curve, and (b) attempt to equate estimated 
marginal revenue and estimated marginal cost. We tried, with very little 
success, to get from the entrepreneurs whom we saw, information about 
elasticity of demand and about the relation between price and marginal cost. 
Most of our informants were vague about anything so precise as elasticity, 
and since most of them produce a wide variety of products we did not know 
how much to rely on illustrative figures of cost. In addition, many, perhaps 
most, apparently make no effort, even implicitly, to estimate elasticity of 
demand or marginal (as opposed to average prime) cost; and of those who 
do, the majority considered the information of little or no relevance to the 
pricing process save perhaps in very exceptional conditions. (p. 18) 
 
It seemed that the theoretical distinction between monopoly or monopolistic 
competition (where the demand curve facing the firm was assumed to be known) and 
oligopoly (where the individual demand curves were indeterminate) was not very 
important for the issue of practical price determination. In reality, businessmen 
operating in all of these markets simply did not ‘know’ their demand curve and, 
furthermore, they did not care to ‘discover’ this demand curve even when they could 
have done so: 
 
Only where oligopoly elements are present is the demand curve 
‘indeterminate’ in the economist’s sense, but in the other cases it is unknown 
to the entrepreneur, and this seems to be the essential point. It is true that in the 
case of monopoly or monopolistic competition the possibility of finding his 
demand curve by experimenting is open to the entrepreneur; but there are 
objections to experimentation, and the prospect of a quiet life seems in many 
cases to have a greater appeal. (pp. 30-1, emphases added) 
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The revelation that firms neglected their demand led to an even more ‘stunning’ 
conclusion, namely, that firms did not try to maximize their profits as suggested by 
standard theory: 
 
The most striking feature of the answers was the number of firms which 
apparently do not aim in their pricing policy, at what appeared to us to be the 
maximization of profits by the equation of marginal revenue and marginal 
cost. (p. 18, emphasis added) 
  
Instead of equating marginal revenue and marginal cost in an attempt to 
maximize profits, Hall and Hitch (p. 18) suggested that businessmen were ‘thinking 
in altogether different terms.’ While under certain circumstances, pricing behaviour 
could be explained by reference to ‘long-term’ profit maximization, in most cases 
businessmen applied a simple ‘rule-of-thumb’ which Hall and Hitch called ‘full-cost’ 
pricing: 
 
The formula used by the different firms in computing ‘full cost’ differ in 
detail . . . but the procedure can be not unfairly generalized as follows: prime 
(or ‘direct’) cost per unit is taken as the base, a percentage addition is made 
to cover overheads (or ‘oncost’, or ‘indirect’ cost), and a further 
conventional addition (frequently 10 per cent.) is made for profit. Selling 
costs commonly and interest on capital rarely are included in overheads; 
when not so included they are allowed for in the addition to profits. (p. 19) 
 
Firms justified their submission to the practical norm of ‘full-cost’ pricing in a variety 
of different ways. Some argued it was the ‘right price,’ other considered its 
application as a ‘fair’ practice toward their competitors, while still others noted that 
experience ‘proved its advisability.’ When asked why they did not charge a price 
higher than that implied by the ‘full-cost’ principle, most entrepreneurs cited their 
uncertainty regarding the response of competitors. When requested to explain why 
they would not charge a price lower than ‘full-cost,’ the businessmen mentioned 
primarily the fear that competitors would match the lower price, the 
unresponsiveness of demand and moral objections to selling below costs. As reasons 
for not changing prices (however fixed), businessmen explained that they wished not 
to ‘disturb’ the stability of market prices and also that buyers had a ‘conventional’ 
price in mind and ‘disliked’ price changes. Hall and Hitch (p. 22, emphasis added) 
felt that ‘All of these reasons militate against changing the price from the conventional 
level,’ yet they stressed that the ‘full-cost’ principle was insufficient to explain this 
‘conventional level’ itself. 
The simplicity of the ‘full-cost’ principle was potentially deceiving. ‘It would be 
useful for economic analysis,’ Hall and Hitch (p. 19-20) wrote, ‘if the magnitude of 
“full cost” in any case could be deduced from the technical conditions of production 
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and the supply prices of the factors,’ but in practice this was impossible for four 
principal reasons. First, costs varied with the size of the firm but firms were rarely 
operating at an ‘optimal’ size which economists could presumably determine; 
instead, their size apparently was the consequence of a ‘historical accident’ which 
economists found very difficult to ‘predict.’ Second, overhead cost per unit depended 
on the ‘normal’ output level used as a divisor in the ‘full-cost’ formula, but this 
benchmark for output was set by arbitrary accounting conventions. Third, selling 
expenses were included in costs but were often depended on demand. Fourth and 
most importantly, the way in which entrepreneurs set the magnitude of 
‘conventional’ profit, or the reasons why they changed it were not at all clear. 
For the businessmen, the ‘full-cost’ principle was a straightforward technical 
matter yet, because of the many ‘arbitrary’ factors involved, the economist could not 
anticipate the final price with any reasonable accuracy. Surprisingly, then, getting 
closer to reality did not seem to enhance our understanding of the pricing process. 
Hall and Hitch questioned the usefulness of neoclassical price theory because its 
preoccupation with what firms ought to be doing turned this theory into a normative 
doctrine. They suggested we explain prices by embarking on a positive scientific 
inquiry into actual pricing decisions made by real businessmen but, unfortunately, 
substituting the businessman’s practice for the economist’s postulate did not seem to 
solve the price question. The explanation provided by businessmen appeared 
‘arbitrary’ and were hardly more revealing than the theories of neoclassical 
economists. Instead of adhering to rigid pricing procedures shaped by necessity, 
entrepreneurs seemed to follow loose ‘conventions’ and ‘norms of conduct’ which 
did not appear to have a solid ‘objective’ rationale. Hall and Hitch discarded the 
normative approach embraced by economists, but their own ‘full-cost’ principle 
seemed to reflect the normative ethic adopted by businessmen. 
One could have removed the deadlock by seeking psychological explanations for 
the behaviour of businessmen but this, of course, would have constituted a retreat 
from the empirical road into the normative twilight. Instead, Hall and Hitch (p. 33) 
emphasized that ‘There is usually some element in the prices ruling at any time 
which can only be explained in the light of the history of the industry.’ The 
rule-of-thumb for pricing included conventions on what constituted ‘normal output,’ 
conventions on how to estimate costs, conventions on how to react or cooperate with 
competitors and, most importantly, conventions on how to set ‘adequate’ profit 
margins. Yet these conventions were shaped by history, not by the erratic fancy of 
businessmen and only by accounting for the specific historical evolution of these 
conventions could one hope to shed some light on current prices. 
The totality of beliefs and conventions prevailing in any one time were 
encompassed in what Hall and Hitch (p. 28) called the ‘community of outlook’ of 
businessmen, and it was within this context that ‘full-cost’ pricing reinforced a 
tendency toward price stability: 
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We cannot say precisely what this price will be, for reasons already 
explained; if it is set anywhere over a fairly wide range it will have a 
tendency to stay there. The nearest that we can get to an exact statement is 
that the price ruling where these conditions obtain is likely to approximate 
to the full cost of the representative firm; and that this price is reached 
directly through the community of outlook of business men, rather than 
indirectly through each firm working at what its most profitable output 
would be if competitors’ reactions are neglected, and if the play of 
competition then varied the number of firms. (pp. 27-8, emphasis added) 
 
In a similar way, price instability was not a direct consequence of changes in 
underlying conditions but was rather created indirectly when such changes led 
individual entrepreneurs to question the prevailing ‘community of outlook’: 
 
Prices in an industry become ‘unstable’ as soon as any of the competitors 
form an idea of a profitable price which is markedly different from the 
existing prices. (p. 28) 
 
‘Full-cost’ pricing implied that prices would likely be altered in response to 
significant changes in the cost of labour or raw material but that, normally, 
businessmen would not question the existing price structure as a result of moderate 
or transitory changes in demand. As Heflebower (1955, p. 361) indicated, the new 
heresy of ‘full-cost’ pricing provided an appealing explanation for relative price 
stability during the Depression, especially after the findings of Hall and Hitch were 
supported by subsequent studies like Saxton (1942), Lester (1946), Dean (1951) 
Oxenfeldt (1951), Fog (1960), Cyert and March (1963) and Skinner (1970).12 
Nevertheless, the imprecise nature of the new approach left it open to criticism from 
mainstream economists who were quick to respond. 
 
4. The Marginalists’ Counterattack 
 
The proposition that businessmen did not try to maximize their profits but rather 
were content with the quiet life of ‘full-cost’ pricing was not universally accepted by 
economists. Leading the neoclassicists’ counterattack, Machlup (1946) argued that 
the rejection of marginal analysis by empirical researchers such as Hall and Hitch 
(1939) and Lester (1946) was in fact baseless.13 In his opinion, Hall and Hitch and 
their followers erred because their research suffered from one or more of the 
following shortcomings: (1) a failure to properly understand the essence of marginal 
                                                 
     12 For surveys of ‘full-cost’ pricing, see Heflebower (1955) and Silberston (1970). 
     13 Similar criticisms of ‘full-cost’ pricing appeared in Robinson (1939) and Kahn (1952). 
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analysis, (2) faulty research techniques, and (3) mistaken interpretations of empirical 
‘findings.’ Let us consider these criticisms in some detail.14 
According to Machlup (p. 521), the emphasis Hall and Hitch put on the ‘history 
of the industry’ in determining current conditions and in shaping behaviour was ‘by 
no means denied by marginal analysis.’ Contrary to common beliefs, he insisted, 
neoclassical theory recognized the role of history and, hence, did not really seek to 
explain how an individual firm determined the levels for its output, prices and 
employment. Rather, the theory focused on how the firm altered these variables in 
response to changing conditions. The overriding principle which guided the firm in 
its actions was the aim of maximum profit and marginal analysis was merely a 
technique used to achieve this goal. 
Machlup emphasized that the procedure whereby the firm equated marginal 
revenue and cost must be interpreted with great care. First, the magnitudes for the 
relevant variables were ‘subjective estimates, guesses and hunches.’ They reflected 
the perceptions, opinions, and beliefs of the businessman and were not necessarily 
equal to the corresponding ‘objective’ magnitudes as they might be observed by 
‘outside’ parties. Second, the businessmen need not be engaged in tedious data 
collection and complicated calculations in order to equate marginal revenue and 
cost. In most cases he could rely on his intimate knowledge of his own business and 
follow an imprecise ‘routine’ which nevertheless accounted for all crucial factors: 
 
The business man who equates marginal net revenue productivity and 
marginal factor cost when he decides how many to employ need not engage 
in higher mathematics, geometry, or clairvoyance. Ordinarily he would not 
even consult with his accountant or efficiency expert in order to arrive at his 
decision; he would not make any tests or formal calculations, he would 
simply rely on his sense or his feel of the situation. There is nothing very 
exact about this sort of estimate. On the basis of hundreds of previous 
experiences of a familiar nature the business man would “just know,” in a 
vague and rough way, whether or not it would pay him to hire more men. 
The subjectivity of his judgements is obvious. (p. 535) 
 
Thus, contrary to the inference of Hall and Hitch (1939) and others, the observation 
that businessmen could not or simply did not know all the objective data, and the 
fact that they did not perform complicated computations failed to demonstrate that 
firms did not seek to maximize profit. 
Hall and Hitch further suggested that entrepreneurs did not make use of concepts 
such as ‘demand elasticity,’ ‘marginal revenue’ and ‘marginal cost,’ and in many 
cases did not even understand them but, according to Machlup, this also did not 
                                                 
     14 For further replies and rejoinders see Lester (1947), Machlup (1947) and Stigler (1947). 
Later comments can be found in Machlup (1967). 
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invalidate the standard theory. While entrepreneurs might have failed to understand 
the marginal concepts as presented to them by Hall and Hitch, they have not 
necessarily failed the crucial test of marginalism. The marginal theory did not 
stipulate that businessmen must use the jargon of marginal analysis as developed by 
economists, only that they follow the marginal principles. Businessmen had no 
interest in the equality of marginal cost and revenue per se but only insofar as it 
helped them evaluate how their action might affect total profit. For that purpose they 
could also use many other guidelines which, although expressed in a different 
language, had practically the same meaning. For instance, a firm might decide to 
raise its price because it expected unit profit to rise by a greater percentage than the 
fall in quantity sold. The decision was based on ‘averages’ and ‘totals’ yet the logic 
was marginal for the focus was on the expected change in profit.  
Given that Hall and Hitch misunderstood the thrust of marginal analysis, and 
given that they baffled the entrepreneurs with academic jargon, it was hardly 
surprising that the two researchers also derived erroneous conclusions from their 
data. To explain this latter point, Machlup (p. 545) summarized the findings of Hall 
and Hitch in their own words: 
 
“A large majority” of them [of businessmen] explained that they charged the 
“full cost” price. Some, however, admitted “that they might charge more in 
periods of exceptionally high demand”; and a greater number reported “that 
they might charge less in periods of exceptionally depressed demand.” 
Competition seemed to induce “firms to modify the margins for profits 
which could be added to direct costs and overheads.” Moreover, “the 
conventional addition for profit varies from firm to firm and even within 
firms for different products.” 
 
According to Machlup (ibid.) these findings, which apparently ‘shook the 
researchers’ confidence in the marginal principle and convinced them that business 
men followed the “full cost principle” of pricing regardless of profit maximization,’ 
were exactly what one would expect to hear on the basis of marginal analysis! Indeed, 
in the neoclassical framework: 
 
we should expect for most industries that price in the long run would not 
deviate too much from average cost, yet that the firm would attempt to get 
better prices when it could safely get them and would not refrain from 
cutting prices when it believed that this would increase its profit or reduce its 
losses. (ibid.) 
 
The observation that different firms behaved differently and that their experience also 
vary over time proved, in Machlup’s opinion, that firms paid close attention to 
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variables other than average cost and, in particular, to those variables which affected 
their demand. In general, he summarized, 
 
there is little or nothing in the findings of this inquiry [by Hall and Hitch] 
that would indicate that the business men observed an average-cost rule of 
pricing when such observance was inconsistent with the maximization of 
profit principle. On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence in the findings 
that the business men paid much attention to demand elasticities – which to 
the economist is equivalent to marginal revenue considerations. (p. 546) 
 
Marginalists attacked ‘full-cost’ pricing on methodological grounds and hence it 
is interesting to note that their own criticisms suffered from similar methodological 
shortcomings. One important complaint against Hall and Hitch was that views of 
businessmen were no substitute for economic theory. Kahn (1952, p. 126), for 
instance, stated that 
 
the fundamental doubt is whether these business men, and other business 
men in similar predicaments, did not feel called upon to devise and present 
to the Oxford intellectuals, a theory of business behaviour which is primarily 
a rationalization and, in considerable measure a false rationalization of 
behaviour based on instinct rather than reasoning. It is with business men’s 
behaviour not with their thoughts, that we have to reckon. The economic 
theory of a business man may be based on the concept of a fair price, which is 
the price which, it is believed, in the absence of special circumstances, ought 
to rule. But very often this theory is a theory of ethics rather than of 
economics, and the business man takes the best price that he can get 
(through if this is higher than the fair price he may be reluctant to extort it to 
the full). 
 
The marginalists rejected the explanations of businessmen for ‘full-cost’ pricing as 
mere ‘ethics,’ ‘rationalization’ and even ‘false rationalization,’ yet their dismissal of 
evidence appeared to be quite selective. When the same businessmen reported on 
deviations from ‘full-cost’ pricing, Kahn and Machlup were only too eager to cite 
them as decisive confirmation of profit maximization. The basis for this selective use 
of evidence is not clear. Machlup (p. 538) wrote that ‘It takes an experienced analyst 
to disentangle actual from imaginary reasons and to separate relevant from irrelevant 
data and essential from decorative bits of information furnished,’ but he failed to 
enumerate the criteria he himself followed in screening the evidence provided by 
Hall and Hitch. If, as Kahn so forcefully asserts, we have to reckon with ‘behaviour’ 
rather than ‘thoughts’ then every interpretation provided by businessmen – whether it 
is consistent or inconsistent with the economic theory under examination – is simply 
extraneous for our purpose.  
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Beyond this double standard toward evidence, the citation from Kahn raises an 
even more serious difficulty concerning our ability to prove or refute the norm of 
profit maximization. A ‘historical’ approach to economic theory could emphasize 
forces beyond the particular inclinations of individuals and claim that, to a large 
extent, individual opinions and convictions are shaped by these forces. Hence, the 
empirical basis for testing such a historical theory for prices can indeed be 
independent from the ‘business creed.’ This conclusion does not hold for neoclassical 
price theory, however. The latter is a theory based on motivation and as such can be 
tested only by resorting to direct evidence on motivation. To say that business 
behaviour is governed by the aim of maximum profit and then to argue that the 
stated goals of businessmen cannot be used as evidence in testing the theory seems to 
us quite inconsistent. Without such direct evidence on motivation the neoclassical 
theory of profit maximization amounts to either a normative recommendation for 
businessmen on how they should act, or else it is simply an axiomatic construct. 
The marginalists could of course claim that, while they did not have direct 
support for the motivational theorem of profit maximization, the observation of 
business performance could provide an indirect test for this basic neoclassical 
postulate. This, however, is easier said than done. For example, Kahn (1952, p. 127) 
concludes that observed performances do not lend clear support to either ‘full-cost’ 
pricing or profit maximization: 
 
The actual behaviour of prices and profits – as revealed by comparisons of 
different firms and products and of different points of time – fails to support 
the “full-cost” principle in its undiluted form. But it fails equally to support, 
in its undiluted form, a narrow interpretation of the operation of the profit 
motive. (emphasis added) 
 
Yet the bases for such conclusions are not clarified by Kahn. We do not have an 
empirical yardstick for ‘maximum profit’ so we cannot really determine whether 
firms obtained this maximum or not. Furthermore, we cannot use business 
performance as evidence for business motivation. Even if we somehow knew what 
maximum profit were and even if we observed that firms indeed obtained this 
maximum, there would be nothing in this observation to demonstrate that firms 
sought maximum profit. Firms could obtain maximum profit by accident or even 
despite their efforts to attain another goal. Alternatively, firms could strive toward 
maximum profits but persistently fail to achieve them. In short, the goal for 
maximum profit can be demonstrated by interviews with businessmen or can be 
simply stipulated by the economist, but it cannot be proven or refuted by business 
performance. 
The second important criticism against Hall and Hitch was that businessmen 
acted not on the basis of objective circumstances, but rather on the basis of their own 
subjective interpretations of these conditions. In particular, it did not matter that 
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entrepreneurs did not know the objective demand curve as long as they acted on the 
basis of their subjective notion of that curve. This explication of the neoclassical 
theory is also problematic because profit maximization becomes consistent with every 
course of action. If, facing an increase in demand, businessmen increase their prices 
we can argue that profit maximization is vindicated, but we can derive the same 
conclusion if businessmen lower their prices instead! In this latter case, we can 
simply argue that businessmen attempted to maximize profits on the basis of 
erroneous interpretations of current conditions. If for some reason they believed that 
demand fell or was just about to fall, a policy to reduce prices would have been quite 
consistent with profit maximization, despite the ‘objective’ increase in demand. 
Thus, it would appear that when profit maximization is based on subjective 
perceptions of businessmen and when these perceptions cannot be accurately 
observed because we cannot rely on what businessmen tell us, the theory becomes 
irrefutable. 
Both adherents of ‘full-cost’ pricing and advocates of profit maximization argued 
that their theories explained business behaviour. They also acknowledged that these 
theories could not be used to predict prices. According to Robinson (1966), the two 
doctrines faced the same barrier mainly because they were unable to explain the profit 
margin. In the ‘full-cost’ approach, price was determined by adding to observed unit 
cost a certain profit markup but this addendum was admittedly ‘arbitrary’: 
 
The gross profit margin, or rake-off on price cost . . . probably depends very 
much upon historical accident or upon conventional views among business 
men as to what is reasonable. And any conventional pattern of behaviour 
which established itself amongst an imperfectly competitive group provides 
a stable result. So long as all adhere to the same set of conventions each can 
enjoy his share of the market, and each can imagine that he is acting 
according to the strict rules of competition, though in fact the group as a 
whole, by unconscious collusion, are imposing a mild degree of monopoly 
upon the market. . . . Where outright monopoly rules, or where a group of 
commodities is produced by a few powerful firms, there is great scope for 
individual variations in policy, and it is hard to make any generalization at 
all as to what governs the margin of profit per unit of output. (Robinson, 
1966, pp. 78-9) 
 
For the neoclassicists, on the other hand, the price was determined when the 
businessmen attempted to maximize his profit by equating marginal revenue and 
marginal cost. The magnitudes for marginal revenue and cost, however, were not as 
clear in practice as they were in theory. The businessmen did not use the ‘true’ value 
from marginal revenue but rather his subjective interpretation for it. Furthermore, 
marginal cost included, in addition to observed expenses, an unspecified figure of 
‘normal’ profit which the entrepreneur presumably added to cover his ‘opportunity 
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cost.’ With both marginal revenue and cost thus obscured, the explanatory power of 
the theory was dramatically reduced. By using observed costs and ex-post prices, we 
could still predict the subjective elasticity of demand but, in doing so, we merely 
explained what we were supposed to know by using what we were supposed to 
explain!: 
 
The gross profit margin, however it is determined, can always be expressed 
in terms of a formula e/(e-1) [where e denotes the elasticity of demand]. For 
instance, if, in a certain case, price is found to be equal to prime cost plus 50 
per cent of prime cost, we may say that the producer concerned acts as 
though he believed the elasticity of demand in his market to be equal to 3. 
But by saying so, we add nothing whatever to our knowledge of how the 
gross margin is determined. (Robinson, 1966, p. 78) 
 
This led Robinson to ponder the dismal prospects of ever answering the ‘first 
problem’ of economics: 
 
All this makes a serious breach in the smooth surface of the orthodox theory 
of value, and it seems that economic science has not yet solved its first 
problem – what determines the price of a commodity? (p. 79) 
 
5. The ‘Target’ Rate of Return 
 
Although the marginalists insisted that ‘full-cost’ pricing was no more than the 
everyday incarnation of profit-maximization policy, sceptics continued to look for 
alternative, hopefully more plausible explanations for ‘rule-of-thumb’ pricing. One of 
the first serious studies on pricing objectives of large U.S. firms was conducted by 
Kaplan, Dirlam and Lanzillotti (1958) as part of their Brookings Institution research 
on Pricing in Big Business. Based on this investigation, Lanzillotti (1958) tended to 
reject both the notion that pricing was motivated by an effort to ‘maximize profit’ 
and the idea that firms simply followed ‘conventions.’ Instead he suggested that, in 
many big companies, ‘full-cost’ pricing was adopted as part of a broader strategy to 
obtain a ‘target’ rate of return on investment. 
Kaplan, Dirlam and Lanzillotti conducted interviews with officials of 20 large 
U.S. companies.15 At the time, all of these firms were among the 200 largest 
industrial corporations and over 10 were among the 100 largest corporations. Some 
(like Johns Manville, U.S. Steel, International Harvester and Union Carbide) were 
dominant price leaders, while others (like Swift and A&P) faced tough competition 
                                                 
     15 Alcoa, American Can, A&P, du Pont, General Electric, General Food, General Motors, 
Goodyear, Gulf, International Harvester, Johns-Manville, Kennecott Copper, Kroger, 
National Steal, Sears, Standard Oil of Indiana, Esso, Swift, Union Carbide and U.S. Steel. 
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and, despite their large size, could not ‘decide’ for the market. The remaining 
companies fell between these two extremes. Company officials were asked detailed 
questions concerning formal and informal commercial goals, procedures for 
implementing and evaluating goals, techniques of price setting, and functions of 
pricing executives and committees. When asked about their pricing objectives, 
officers often cited several goals but in over 10 of the 20 firms surveyed, the primary 
objective was to achieve a target rate of return. According to Lanzillotti (1958, p. 
923fn), 
 
Target-return is defined as the building up of a price structure designed to 
provide such a return on capital employed for specific products, product 
groups, and divisions, as to yield a predetermined corporate average return. 
In most cases management referred to stockholders’ equity (net worth) plus 
long-term debt. Usually, a standard cost system is used as a means of 
allocating fixed cost to various product divisions, with the standards 
premised on an assumed rate of production, typically about 70 per cent to 80 
per cent of capacity, and an assumed product-mix as “normal.” 
 
Kaplan et al., it should be noted, were not the first to unveil the practice of 
target-return pricing. The essential aspects of this pricing practice were described 
already in the early 1920s by Brown, who was a vice president of General Motors at 
the time. Brown (1924) explained that General Motors customarily began with a 
target of achieving a 20 percent rate of return on stockholders’ equity and geared its 
pricing policies toward that end. The price calculations were based on the 
assumption of a certain ‘standard’ volume of production (usually 80 percent of 
practical annual capacity which represented the ‘normal average rate of plant 
operation’). Cost items were classified as being either variable or fixed and the 
corresponding average cost per unit were determined by dividing the total figures by 
the ‘standard’ volume. Unit profit was similarly determined by dividing the target for 
total profit by the ‘standard’ volume. The ‘benchmark’ price was then set as the sum 
of unit variable cost, unit fixed cost and unit profit. Brown noted that although 
fluctuations in actual production would affect unit fixed cost, it was not really 
practical or even desirable to alter the price whenever there was a change in 
production in order to continuously maintain the profit margin at the pre-specified 
level. Since output was expected to oscillate around the ‘standard’ volume, 
maintaining the ‘benchmark’ price despite fluctuations in production would enable 
the firm to achieve its target as an average rate of return over time. Hence, in this 
early explanation, Brown already provided a simple rationale for both the practice of 
‘full-cost’ pricing and for the relative inflexibility of ‘administered prices’ which were 
to be discovered by economists more than a decade later. 
 In 1955, Bradley who, together with Brown, developed the target return method 
for pricing in General Motors testified in front of a Congressional committee that the 
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same principles were still vigorously applied by his company.16 The research by 
Kaplan et al. (1958) and the summary by Lanzillotti (1958) were important because 
they indicated that a target rate of return has been a principal pricing objective not 
only for General Motors, but for many other leading U.S. firms as well. The studies 
were significant also because they pointed to certain limitations on what we could 
learn from exploring pricing ‘objectives.’ 
Lanzillotti (1958) emphasized that pricing toward a target rate of return was a 
primary objective only for firms which had substantial market power and occupied a 
price-leading position in their industry. Most other large firms cited alternative goals 
such as the need to ‘meet’ (or prevent) competition, the desire to stabilize prices and 
margins, an aim to realize a certain market share, the wish to resolve conflict of 
interests between the different firms and a desire not to arouse public protest and 
prevent adverse political and legal backlashes. In most cases, there was one 
paramount objective but it was evident that, in many situations, pricing was also 
influenced by a combination of subsidiary goals. Even when target-return pricing was 
the dominant objective, it was hard to separate this from other justifications provided 
by company officials: 
 
A variety of explanations was given by the companies to justify the 
particular size of the profit target used as a guide in pricing decisions. The 
most frequently mentioned rationalizations included: (a) fair or reasonable 
return, (b) the traditional industry concept of fair return in relation to risk 
factors, (c) desire to equal or better the corporation average return over a 
recent period, (d) what the company felt it could get as a long-run matter, 
and (e) use of a specific profit target as a means of stabilizing industry prices. 
At least one of the foregoing, and most frequently the first, was mentioned 
by the companies interviewed, and in a few cases the entire list was offered 
as justification for the company profit goal. This reinforces the observation 
that no single objective or policy rules all price-making in any given company. 
In fact, in many companies a close interrelationship exists among 
target-return pricing, desire to stabilize prices, and target market-share 
(either a minimum or a maximum objective). (p. 931, emphases added) 
 
The complexity of these considerations indicated that knowing the objectives of the 
firm still provided the economist with little or no clue about the causes for adopting 
these objectives.  
The key question of what determined the target rate of return remained open and 
Lanzillotti suggested that this target and the pricing practices used to achieve it were 
                                                 
     16 Bradley’s testimony is included in 84th Congress, 1st Sess., Senate Subcommittee on 
Antitrust and Monopoly, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Hearings on General Motors, 1955, 
Pt. 7, p. 3593, and is reported in Blair (1972), p. 470. 
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determined together with the firm’s investment decisions. He began his explanation 
by noting that large firms appreciated the complexities of modern business and paid 
close attention to their implications. These companies realized the delicacy of their 
dealings with external suppliers and customers, as well as the complexity of 
interrelationships between the various units within the firm itself. They also 
acknowledged the intricacy of corporate rivalries in individual markets and in the 
economy as a whole. Furthermore, because of their size, the actions of large firms 
were potential targets for the media, legislators and the justice system, so the political 
cost of ‘irresponsible’ behaviour might far exceed their immediate pecuniary benefits. 
Finally, all large firms viewed price competition as a dangerous policy alternative 
that should be avoided as much as possible. Under these circumstances, argued 
Lanzillotti (p. 936), business executives viewed the market as a creature of the firm. 
They felt it was their responsibility to perpetuate the firm’s position and to preserve 
its different relationships. From their perspective, prices should not be left to 
anonymous and potentially destabilizing ‘market forces’ and must be set in 
accordance with a ‘pricing policy.’ 
In this light, the ideal notion of ‘profit maximization’ took a new meaning. 
Large firms that sought to ‘maximize’ profits could not afford to obey erratic market 
signals and must follow their own price planning. In fact, the stronger the drive for 
profits and accumulation, the more compelling was the imperative for a careful pricing 
policy. Of course, firms did not have to stress the priority of profit and accumulation. 
In a corporatist environment where the market was perceived as a ‘subset’ of the 
firm, company executives tended to advance a philosophy which stressed 
‘responsibility,’ ‘leadership’ and ‘cooperation’ and to present corporate policies as 
striving for a ‘just prices’ and a ‘fair return.’ Lanzillotti noted that company officials 
habitually claimed that their products faced a wide array of substitutes and that, 
consequently, their price discretion was in fact minimal. Under these circumstances, 
the executives argued, the administration of prices by ‘price leaders’ merely 
‘approximates the market equilibrium.’ Instead of deciding to engage in cutthroat 
competition (which was a price ‘policy’ in itself), large firms chose to ‘administer’ 
prices and in this sense they provided an advantageous public service. Both price 
competition and price administration would lead to similar long-run price trends, 
they contended, but the latter arrangement saved the system from the destabilizing 
effects of severe price fluctuations. 
Lanzillotti rejected this common rhetoric. Price ‘leadership,’ he argued, could 
not be taken as a proxy for equilibrium unless we took the latter to denote whatever 
the firm happened to decide. In his view, the data overwhelmingly demonstrated that 
firms based their pricing upon ‘planned profits’ (p. 938). Instead of ‘administered 
prices’ he suggested the concept of ‘administered profits’ which were set to meet 
specific investment plans: 
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The company proceeds on the assumption of the need for a certain amount 
of capital to undertake the investment in plant expansion and new facilities 
which are envisaged for the long haul in order to maintain and/or improve 
market position. . . . The only way in which price policy can be viewed in 
such companies as these, with their wide variety of products and selling in a 
large number of different markets, is in terms of profits-investment ratios. 
This criterion serves as an effective guide for pricing decisions at divisional 
and departmental levels. If we are to speak of “administrative” decisions in 
the large firm, it is perhaps more accurate to speak of administered profits 
rather than administered prices. (p. 938) 
 
Yet the administration of profit was a process no less complex than the 
administration of prices. Lanzillotti argued further that 
 
(a) the large company has a fairly well defined pricing goal that is related to 
a long-range profit horizon; (b) its management seeks – especially in 
multiproduct operations – a simultaneous decision with respect to price, cost 
and product characteristics; and (c) its pricing formulas are handy devices 
for checking the internal consistency of the separate decisions as against the 
general company objectives. Under this hypothesis no single theory of the 
firm – and certainly no single motivational hypothesis such as profit 
maximization – is likely to impose an unambiguous course of action for the 
firm for any given situation; nor will it provide a satisfactory basis for valid 
and useful predications of price behavior. (ibid.) 
 
This suggested that the debate over administered prices was partially 
misdirected. The notion that prices were stable or ‘inflexible’ because they were 
based on rigid pricing procedures was potentially misleading because these 
procedures were themselves subject to change. This point was clarified by noting the 
bureaucratic dichotomy between middle and top management: 
 
Managerial specialists down the line are given a framework of requirements 
that must be met, while managers at the top, of course, are free to and do 
change these requirements to meet particular situations. (p. 939) 
 
The recognition that firms may have a complex set of objectives and that these are 
inherently dynamic presents a serious methodological difficulty if we want to use 
such objectives as bases for price theories. Many company executives candidly 
endorse corporatist ideals whereby pricing procedures reflect ‘responsibility’ and 
‘leadership,’ but this rhetoric does not provide the researcher with much insight. 
More importantly, the way in which firms determine their ‘requirements’ for 
expansion and profit must be understood as part of a dual process. While corporate 
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decisions may affect the performance of firms, these decisions themselves are 
formulated in the context of the firm’s own history and the general business climate. 
Corporate objectives may guide the short term behaviour of large firms but these 
objectives themselves will be continuously modified by actual performance and 
corporate projections regarding the firm’s evolving environment. In this sense, the 
success or failure in achieving company objectives – whether they are formulated to 
‘maximize profits’ or to achieve a ‘target rate of return’ – can never be tested because 
the causal relationship between any such goal and its realization is double sided.  
With this in mind, it is hardly surprising to find that large firms ‘succeed’ in 
meeting their ‘targets.’ For example, Blair (1972, p. 482-93) compared the target and 
actual rates of return for a group of 5 leading companies over the 16-year period 
between 1953 and 1968. (The group included General Motors, U.S. Steel, Alcoa, 
Standard Oil and Du Pont.) He concluded that ‘Over the 16-year period the success 
of the 5 leaders in meeting their profit objectives is little short of remarkable’ (p. 482) 
but this, of course, does not establish a clear line of causality between target and 
actual rates. Under stable conditions, targets rarely change simply because they are 
achieved, but under dynamic conditions firms might be tempted to alter their targets 
in light of new circumstances or can be compelled to do so in order to accommodate 
new realities. For instance, during the 1950s, U.S. Steel apparently attempted to raise 
its target rate of return from 8 to 12 percent but subsequently it had to reverse this 
decision when its large price increases were accompanied by an unacceptable fall in 
volume. Another illustration is provided by General Motors. The company, which 
from the 1920s has managed to realize an average target rate of return of 20 percent, 
had to reduce its target in face of intensified competition since the 1970s. In both of 
these cases, it appears the target was amended, at least in part, in order to enable the 
firm to successfully achieve it. Hence we should not be surprised to find that the 
firms succeeded in meeting revised targets. 
 
6. The Anthropology of Business Behaviour: An Interpretation 
 
The ideas of ‘administered prices,’ ‘full-cost pricing’ and ‘target rate of profit’ seemed 
to have undermined simplistic convictions about business behaviour. The ambiguity 
was intensified when prominent neoclassicists, in an attempt to shield their 
paradigm, introduced ‘subjectivity’ into profit maximization and ‘confessed’ that the 
theory was not intended to explain the actual price but only the direction of its 
movement. The heightened debate over how businessmen ‘behaved’ questioned the 
usefulness of adhering to a single ‘ideal type.’ It was suggested that firms did not 
necessarily obey an externally imposed goal, such as the achievement of maximum 
profit and, in many cases, followed their own objectives which they defined and 
occasionally altered. Furthermore, it appeared that business behaviour in general, 
and pricing practices in particular, did not always conform to unique procedures and 
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could not be described by simple mechanisms. This presented a serious 
methodological difficulty for the theory of price movements.  
The success of neoclassical price theory was contingent, to a large extent, on the 
ability of this theory to abstract from underlying dynamics of economic and other 
social relations. The focus on price as the ultimate variable of interest was required to 
reduce social relations and aspects of economic structure into a simple static 
framework. Firms are commonly assumed to operate in one of 4 possible market 
structures, which are fixed for the purpose of analysis. The structure affects the way 
firms set their prices but, since this structure is assumed to be fixed, it cannot be 
altered by price behaviour. Note that the static framework is not merely the first step 
toward a broader dynamic theory as neoclassicists often like to stress. If we allow 
price behaviour by firms such as IBM, General Motors or Exxon to alter the 
economic environment in which they operate, we introduce a fundamental 
‘non-stationarity’ that is likely to undermine our ability to ‘predict’ such price 
behaviour. For this reason, the assumption that structure affects prices but prices do 
not affect structure is quite fundamental to neoclassical theory. This stationarity 
requirement also explains why it is necessary to assume that a businessman is a slave 
to a single fixed goal such as ‘profit maximization.’ Without a clear goal, the 
functional link between objective conditions and price behaviour is severed and 
prices become ‘arbitrary.’  
The new ambiguities regarding the autonomy and diversity of business 
behaviour in modern capitalist economies removed much of the stationarity 
necessary for a solid price theory. In the neoclassical paradigm, the theorist could 
ignore the axiomatic nature of ‘profit maximization’ because this assumption was 
deeply embedded within the model and was rarely questioned. With the enlarged 
menu for potential patterns of business behaviour, things became more complicated. 
The observation that pricing goals and practices were not really fixed and changed 
with business conditions suggested that we could not ignore structural dynamics in 
our explanation for prices. It also insinuated that the behaviour of prices could 
operate to affect underlying structures. 
Many economists, it must be noted, failed to realize that the expanding field of 
‘business anthropology’ created a methodological minefield. Instead of shying away 
from arbitrary assumptions about ‘business motivation,’ many preferred to ignore the 
potential hazard and actually welcomed their new freedom to chose. The result has 
been a flood of alternative models for inflation which could be distinguished mainly 
on the basis of their arbitrary behaviourial assumptions. We consider some of these 
models in Nitzan (1990). 
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